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Abstract
As business-to-business commerce shifts to the Internet, newer suppliers with
cheaper but unreliable technologies enter the market place to win orders from firms
by beating the price of their perfectly reliable (but expensive) competitors. The
dilemma facing purchasing firms is the allocation of the tender across suppliers
of varying supply reliability. We model the procurement problem as a sealed-bid
auction where the buyer has to allocate purchases between an expensive but reliable
supplier and a cheaper but unreliable supplier, and the suppliers specify prices for
diﬀerent proportions of the tender awarded to them. A unique feature of our model
is that it allows the purchasing firm to reserve the right to change the size of the total
tender awarded depending on the nature of the bids received from the suppliers. We
prove that the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of eﬃcient
outcomes, and for strictly convex cost functions, the outcome is unique. Further,
we show that the possibility of implicit supplier collusion is strengthened in that the
suppliers may structure their bids forcing the buyer to allocate the tender resulting
in the worst-case (highest price) scenario for him. We also show that the Anton-Yao
(A-Y, 1989) model can be interpreted as a limiting case of our model and that the
eﬃcient outcome derived in this paper is the only robust outcome in the A-Y model.
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1. Introduction
Electronic Commerce on the Internet oﬀers an eﬃcient way to do business by bringing
together many potential producers and consumers. According to a recent article in Busi-
ness Week (May 2000), B2B transactions may revolutionize the way Asian manufacturers
trade with the rest of the world by allowing small and mid-sized manufacturers to find a
new sphere of buyers. While the Internet provides for more opportunities for trade, the
reliability and trustworthiness of suppliers may vary significantly. Newer suppliers with
cheaper but unreliable technologies may enter the market place and try to win orders
from firms by beating the price of their perfectly reliable (but expensive) competitors.
This puts the buyers in a dilemma:
“ ... Sure, they may save a ton of money by holding a reverse auction, but how
can they be sure that the low-bidding suppliers can actually fill their orders,”
(Feuerstein, October 2000).
The issue we address in this paper is whether buyers should award the full tender to
reliable but expensive suppliers with whom they were doing business so far, or take a risk
and award parts of the tender to the newcomers oﬀering low prices. In particular, we
consider the procurement problem for a buyer who has to allocate the purchases between
an expensive but reliable supplier and a cheaper but unreliable supplier.1 For example,
a buyer in North America may have a trusted local/regional supplier, but would like to
explore business opportunities with newer and cheaper (but with unproven technology)
Asian suppliers who have just entered the market place.2
Due to uncertain production processes in certain industries (for example, semiconduc-
tor manufacturing and electronics industries), the unreliable supplier may be unable to
execute the supply contract on time. For the reliable supplier, investment in better tech-
1Multiple sourcing is frequently observed in practice in both industrial (Treleven and Schweikhart
1988) as well as government procurements (Mayer 1987).
2While used or perishable goods typically lend themselves to auctions, the idea is being extended and
General Electric, for instance, has a website that lists the supplies it needs, and any supplier can bid to
sell them. Several success stories about such auctions have been cited by Turban (1997).
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nology along with maintaining safety stock of items ensures that the supply process is not
disrupted. Charging a higher price to guarantee delivery can then be justified. For buyers
facing concentrated selling seasons (for example, selling toys during Christmas season),
any delay in component deliveries from the supplier could result in expensive shortage
situations. In some cases, the buyer may as a last resort produce critical components
in-house at a high cost.
In the auction model considered in the paper, both suppliers (reliable and unreliable)
submit a sealed bid that specifies prices for diﬀerent proportions of the tender awarded
to them. The size of the total award is a decision variable for the buyer as the existence
of an unreliable supplier may induce the buyer to inflate the input order size. Conversely,
the buyer may choose not to award the full tender originally announced and move some
of the production to the in-house production facility.3 Anton and Yao (1989) (henceforth
A-Y) consider a similar sealed-bid procurement auction model and derive a continuum of
Nash equilibrium outcomes for the case of two reliable suppliers. For each outcome, the
orders are split awards, in that the total award size is fixed and the allocation decision is
to determine the proportion to be awarded to each supplier. Our paper diﬀers from A-Y
paper in three ways. First, we suppose that one of the suppliers is unreliable in delivery.
Second, we allow for the option of in-house production in our model. Third, and most
importantly, we allow for the possibility of over-procurement (to hedge against the failure
of the unreliable supplier from not delivering) and under-procurement (that is, to move
part of the production in-house). As a result of this added flexibility in order allocation,
we prove that the set of eﬃcient outcomes (outcomes that minimize total production
costs) coincides with the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes, and for strictly convex cost
functions, the outcome is unique. Further, as compared to A-Y model, we discuss that the
implicit collusive behavior of the suppliers is strengthened. For the example of quadratic
production costs, we show that the buyer makes a strictly positive award to both the
3In the absence of an in-house production facility, the buyer may incur shortage penalty costs due to
partial fulfillment of its tender requirements.
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suppliers as well as to the in-house production facility. Comparative statics analysis of
the eﬀects of production costs and the reliability of supply is provided. Finally, it is
shown that the A-Y model can be interpreted as a limiting case of our model and that
the eﬃcient outcome derived here is the only robust outcome in the A-Y model.
In the related literature, the problem of supply unreliability has been well studied in
the context of single and multi-item random yield inventory models (Henig and Gerchak
1990, Yano and Lee 1995, Gurnani et al. 1996; 2000).4 Supply unreliability is often
cited as justification for why firms second source in order to hedge against the failure
of one supplier from not delivering on time (Leidy 1992, Ketchpel and Garcia-Molina
1998).5 Recently, Gurnani and Shi (2000) considered a B2B bargaining model where the
buyer and the supplier have asymmetric beliefs on the level of supply unreliability. They
derived a non-symmetric contract that is incentive compatible and maximizes channel
profits under certain conditions.
Game theoretic treatment of various auction models are surveyed in McAfee and
McMillan (1987) and Milgrom (1989), while some experimental results are reported in
Kagel and Roth (1995). More specifically, in the procurement auction literature with
second sourcing, Anton and Yao (1987) modeled the procurement problem as a two-stage
process in which initial production is governed by a contract between the government and
the developer. In the second stage, competition is induced by an auction in which a sec-
ond source competitively bids for remaining production. The sequential sourcing process
is designed to extract private cost information from the suppliers. In other papers, An-
ton and Yao (1989; 1992) studied the split-award auction problem with symmetric and
asymmetric (that is, with private information) costs respectively. In both papers, the
procurement decision for the buyer is to determine the sole sourcing or split-award equi-
librium outcomes. Further, Anton and Yao discuss that while supplier diversification is
4In all these papers, supplier prices are assumed to be fixed, that is, they are exogenous to the model.
5While multiple sourcing reduces the risk of stockouts, the evidence from private and government
auctions suggests that the prospect of supplier collusion leading to noncompetitive bidding increases
(Meeker 1984, Boger and Liao 1988, Anton and Yao 1989).
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traditionally used to promote price competition, the eﬃcient outcome, which is one of
(many possible) Nash equilibrium outcomes, exhibits strong collusive features resulting in
the maximum procurement price for the buyer. In our paper, the set of eﬃcient outcomes
coincides with the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes and as such the possibility of implicit
supplier collusion is strengthened.
While all the papers above assume that the number of bidders is given exogenously,
in the model of Seshadri et al. (1991) the number of active bidders is determined endoge-
nously — they considered a multiple source procurement problem to investigate the eﬀect
of multiple sourcing on competitive behavior prior to supplier selection. More recently,
Seshadri (1995) analyzed the supplier selection and control problem in an integrated fash-
ion. In his paper, two suppliers are drawn from several vendors through a competitive
bidding process, and the winner of the bidding competition receives a large share of the
contract and also benefits due to the credible commitment made by the buyer. In an-
other paper, Klotz and Chatterjee (1995) considered a repeated procurement competition
problem with production learning and entry costs (for the suppliers). Using a two-period
model, they explored the eﬀectiveness of dual sourcing in facilitating competition between
the suppliers as a means of counteracting the competition-reducing eﬀects of production
learning and entry costs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the model
assumptions and formulate the bidding problem for the suppliers and the procurement
problem for the buyer. In section 3, we characterize the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes
of the game and show that it coincides with the set of eﬃcient outcomes. The strength-
ening of implicit price collusion is also established. In section 4, using the example of
quadratic production costs, we do the comparative statics analysis and show that the
A-Y model can be interpreted as a limiting case of our model. Finally, in section 5, we
conclude and discuss future research.
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2. The Model
A buyer is contemplating to procure x units of a good from two potential suppliers.6
Supplier R is the longtime trusted and reliable supplier whereas supplier U, quite new
in business having just entered the market place, has an uncertain production process
leading to unreliability in delivery. Following Turnbull (1986), Leidy (1992) and Gurnani
et al. (1996), we assume that delivery by the unreliable supplier, U, is dichotomous —
either he delivers 100% of the order, or he delivers nothing at all.7 U receives his payment
only when he delivers his order. Let β ∈ (0, 1] be the probability that U can fulfil his
order.
In traditional procurement settings, the buyer would make allocation decisions based
on fixed prices quoted by the supplier, or negotiate with the supplier for quantity-driven
price discounts. With the proliferation of electronic market places, new business models
have evolved and price-driven auctions have become very popular.8 In this paper, we
consider a sealed-bid auction where each supplier submits a bid that specifies prices for
diﬀerent proportions of x that is awarded to him. That is, if αx and γx units are awarded
to suppliers U and R respectively,9 α ∈ [0, 1] and γ ∈ [0, 1], the bids are functions
PU(α) for supplier U and PR(γ) for supplier R, where Pi : [0, 1] → <, i = U, R, with
PU(0) = 0 = PR(0). Unlike Anton and Yao (1989), we do not restrict α and γ to add up to
unity, that is, awards are not necessarily split awards. The reason for this is very intuitive
in the face of supplier unreliability. For instance, even if the full contract is awarded to
supplier U (i.e., α = 1), he might default on delivery, and, to be on the safe side, it is
6In our paper, we assume that two potential eligible suppliers have been identified. See Barua et al.
(1997) for a discussion of supplier selection strategies.
7The ‘all or nothing’ nature of deliveries of the unreliable supplier can be justified as follows. When
transportation costs are high, the contract may specify delivery in a single shipment to avoid the high
administrative and operational costs of keeping track of part shipments. Also, for buyers facing concen-
trated selling seasons (for example, selling toys during Christmas season), on-time delivery is critical as
late component deliveries from the suppliers become useless.
8The scope of our model is general and is applicable in both electronic and non-electronic auction
settings.
9Throughout the paper we follow the notation that an order (α, γ) indicates that αx units are awarded
to supplier U and γx units to supplier R.
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quite natural for the buyer to order some share from the reliable supplier. Thus, α+γ > 1
is a natural possibility in the presence of supplier unreliability. We also allow α and γ to
add up to less than unity to capture the fact that buyers usually reserve the right not to
award the full tender originally announced.10
Suppliers U and R face the costs of production CU(α) and CR(γ) respectively, where
Ci : [0, 1] → <, i = U, R, with CU(0) = 0 = CR(0). Supplier U is unreliable because,
presumably, he is using an inferior (and, of course, cheaper) technology. So we assume
that CU(α) < CR(α), for all α ∈ (0, 1]. Following Anton and Yao (1989), we also assume
that the suppliers have complete information about each other’s costs when they bid.
Recall that deliveries are ‘all or nothing’ in nature, that is, if the unreliable supplier
cannot deliver his promised share on time, he does not deliver at all. If a share δ ∈ [0, 1] of
x remains undelivered, the buyer’s outside option or penalty isK(δ), whereK : [0, 1]→ <,
with K(0) = 0. This outside option can be given the following alternative interpretations:
the buyer can produce in-house11 at a high cost K(δ), or, alternatively, the buyer bears
the penalty of nondelivery to his own customers (the opportunity cost of revenue forgone)
the value of which is K(δ). Whatever be the interpretation, it is natural to assume that
K(δ) > CR(δ) > CU(δ), for all δ ∈ (0, 1].
When the buyer places any order (α, γ), the total cost to the system has three com-
ponents — production costs of suppliers U and R, and the expected penalty or in-house
production cost of the buyer. Given any order (α, γ), let us define the total system cost
as
TSC(α, γ) = CU(α) + CR(γ) + βK
³
{1− (α+ γ)}+
´
+ (1− β)K(1− γ),
10If the full tender is not guaranteed to be awarded, one would expect, ex ante, that the suppliers
would compete more aggressively in their bids.
11For example, in some defense procurement auctions, the government auctions production rights to
private developers and also retains the government-owned production option (Dana and Spier 1994).
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where {1− (α+ γ)}+ =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0, if (α+ γ) ≥ 1,
1− (α+ γ), if (α+ γ) < 1.
If the suppliers put the bids PU(·) and PR(·) and the buyer places the order (α, γ),
supplier R earns the profit πR(γ) = PR(γ) − CR(γ), while supplier U ’s expected profit
is defined by πU(α) = βPU(α) − CU(α).12 The suppliers maximize expected profits, and
their participation is ensured by restricting our attention to bids for which πU(α) ≥ 0 and
πR(γ) ≥ 0.
The buyer’s expected procurement cost is
G(α, γ) = βPU(α) + PR(γ) + βK
³
{1− (α+ γ)}+
´
+ (1− β)K(1− γ),
and the buyer places the order (α, γ) to minimize the expected procurement cost, that
is,
(α, γ) ∈ argmin
(α,γ)∈[0,1]×[0,1]
{G(α, γ)} . (1)
The timing of the game is as follows: the suppliers simultaneously (and non-cooperatively)
submit the sealed bid functions PU(·) and PR(·), and then the buyer chooses the order
(α, γ) that minimizes the expected procurement cost.
A Nash equilibrium involves a pair of bids submitted by the suppliers, (P ∗U(α), P
∗
R(γ)),
such that the bids are mutually best responses for them. Given the equilibrium bids, if an
order (α∗, γ∗)minimizes the buyer’s expected procurement cost (that is, satisfies (1)), then
(α∗, γ∗) is an equilibrium outcome. The equilibrium procurement price is denoted by g∗,
that is, g∗ = G(α∗, γ∗) = βP ∗U(α
∗)+P ∗R(γ
∗)+βK
³
{1− (α∗ + γ∗)}+
´
+(1−β)K(1−γ∗).
A sole-source outcome is an order (α, γ) such that either α = 0 or γ = 0, whereas a
multi-source outcome is an order (α, γ) where 0 < α ≤ 1 and 0 < γ ≤ 1.
12U receives his bid price PU (α) only when he delivers the promised amount αx. In case of non-delivery,
he is not paid at all but has to bear the cost CU (α) in either situation.
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3. Nash Equilibrium, Eﬃciency and Implicit Price Collusion
To analyze the auction game, in this section we first characterize the Nash equilibrium
bids and then use this characterization to rule out the possibility of over-ordering as an
equilibrium outcome. Then, we derive the set of equilibrium outcomes and the structure
of the equilibrium bids, profits and procurement prices, and demonstrate that the set of
equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of eﬃcient outcomes. Finally, we note how
implicit supplier collusion leads to the worst-case outcome for the buyer and discuss the
strengthening of the implicit collusion possibility as compared to the Anton-Yao model.
3.1. Characterizing the Nash Equilibrium Bids
In this subsection we first characterize the Nash equilibrium bids and the associated
outcomes.
In a sole-source award, one of the suppliers gets no order. If an arbitrary sole-source
order, (α, 0), is awarded to supplier U, then the procurement price is βPU(α) + βK(1−
α)+(1−β)K(1). Similarly, if an arbitrary sole-source order, (0, γ), is awarded to supplier
R, the procurement price becomes PR(γ)+K(1−γ). Sole-source prices play an important
role in determining equilibrium bids, profits and the procurement price as shown in the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose that (P ∗U(α), P ∗R(γ)) is a pair of Nash equilibrium bids, and that
g∗ is the corresponding equilibrium procurement price. Then there exists α ∈ (0, 1] and
γ ∈ (0, 1] such that g∗ = βP ∗U(α) + βK(1− α) + (1− β)K(1) = P ∗R(γ) +K(1− γ).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, Lemma 1 implies that there exists at least one sole-sourcing bid for each
supplier such that the buyer is indiﬀerent to either of these sole-sourcing outcomes in
equilibrium. Further, if the equilibrium allocation is a dual sourcing award, that is both
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α > 0 and γ > 0, the sole-sourcing outcomes provide an upper bound on the procurement
cost for the buyer for any equilibrium outcome.
Next, we derive the deviation conditions for the suppliers which serve as necessary
conditions for the Nash equilibrium outcome(s). Consider a situation where the suppliers
have put the bids (PU , PR) and the buyer has placed the order (α, γ). Bidder U can
profitably induce the buyer to switch away from the order (α, γ) if there exists another
order (bα, bγ) such that U can find a price bp at bα where U ’s expected profit is greater
(πU(bα) > πU(α)) and the buyer faces a lower expected procurement cost (G(bα, bγ) <
G(α, γ)), that is, β bp−CU(bα) > βPU(α)−CU(α), and β bp+PR(bγ)+βK ³{1− (bα+ bγ)}+´+
(1 − β)K(1 − bγ) < βPU(α) + PR(γ) + βK ³{1− (α+ γ)}+´ + (1 − β)K(1 − γ). Such a
bp exists if and only if the following inequality is satisfied: PR(γ) − PR(bγ) > [CU(bα) +
βK
³
{1− (bα+ bγ)}+´+(1−β)K(1−bγ)]−[CU(α)+βK ³{1− (α+ γ)}+´+(1−β)K(1−γ)].
After some simplifications (using πR(γ) = PR(γ)−CR(γ)) we conclude that bidder U can
profitably induce the buyer to switch away from the order (α, γ) if there exists an order
(bα, bγ) such that
πR(γ) + CU(α) + CR(γ) + βK
³
{1− (α+ γ)}+
´
+ (1− β)K(1− γ)
> πR(bγ) + CU(bα) + CR(bγ) + βK ³{1− (bα+ bγ)}+´+ (1− β)K(1− bγ). (2a)
Similarly, bidder R can profitably induce the buyer to switch away from the order (α, γ)
if there exists an order (bα, bγ) such that
πU(α) + CU(α) + CR(γ) + βK
³
{1− (α+ γ)}+
´
+ (1− β)K(1− γ)
> πU(bα) + CU(bα) + CR(bγ) + βK ³{1− (bα+ bγ)}+´+ (1− β)K(1− bγ). (2b)
To qualify to be a Nash equilibrium, a pair of bids, (P ∗U(·), P ∗R(·)), must obey Lemma
1 and the deviation conditions (2a) and (2b).
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3.2. Possibility of Over-ordering
In section 2, we discussed that in the presence of supplier unreliability one cannot a priori
rule out the possibility of over-ordering. In particular, even after awarding the full tender
to the unreliable supplier, the buyer may still like to place some order to the reliable
supplier just in case the unreliable supplier defaults. But, as the following lemma shows,
it turns out that over-ordering cannot be an equilibrium outcome.
Lemma 2. An order (α, γ) such that 0 < α ≤ 1, 0 < γ ≤ 1, and α + γ > 1 is not an
equilibrium outcome if CU(·) is strictly increasing.
Proof. Consider the order (bα, γ) such that bα + γ = 1. Using (2a), we find that supplier
U can profitably induce the buyer to switch away from the order (α, γ) (where α+γ > 1)
by changing his bid at bα if CU(α) > CU(bα). But we have α > 1−γ, and bα = 1−γ. Hence
this condition always holds when CU(·) is strictly increasing. Q.E.D.
The proof indicates that irrespective of the order placed with the reliable supplier (γ),
the split-award outcome (that is, one with α + γ = 1) always dominates the outcome
with over-ordering (that is, with α+ γ > 1). Intuitively, since the buyer does not get any
benefit from the excess supply (if it is delivered), whereas it costs more to supplier U to
produce the extra amount, therefore supplier U structures his bids so as to refrain the
buyer from over-ordering. This explains the somewhat surprising approach in the proof
in that supplier U induces the buyer to reduce his own share of the contract.13
13The argument for ruling out over-ordering so far relies on the assumption that the buyer does not get
any benefit from the excess supply, that is, there is no salvage value for excess inventory. If we allow for
the possibility of salvage, Lemma 2 gets modified as follows. For a unit salvage value S, if CU (α) > βSα,
for all α > 0, then (α, γ) such that 0 < α ≤ 1, 0 < γ ≤ 1, and α+ γ > 1 is not an equilibrium outcome.
Intuitively, the condition implies that if the salvage value is low enough such that the expected salvage
revenue is less than the cheapest way to produce the items, then over-ordering will not be an equilibrium
outcome. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 2 and is omitted.
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3.3. Nash Equilibrium
Lemma 2 demonstrates that over-ordering cannot be an equilibrium outcome. At the
same time it illustrates how we can use the general deviation conditions ((2a) and (2b))
in a particular way to rule out a potential outcome to be an equilibrium one: to rule
out the possibility of (α, γ) we show the existence of another allocation (bα, γ) such that
supplier U can induce the buyer to switch away from the order (α, γ) by changing his bid
at bα. Since the awards are not necessarily split awards in our model, that is, α + γ may
not be equal to 1, we have the flexibility to switch from the order (α, γ) to (bα, γ) without
changing the allocation for supplier R. In case of Anton-Yao model, since all awards are
split awards, changing the allocation for one supplier also changes the allocation for the
other supplier. In this subsection, we use the deviation conditions in this particular way
to narrow down the set of possible Nash equilibrium outcomes significantly.
From (2a), we find that supplier U can induce a profitable deviation away from the
order (α, γ) if there exists an allocation (bα, γ) such that
CU(α) + βK
³
{1− (α+ γ)}+
´
> CU(bα) + βK ³{1− (bα+ γ)}+´ . (3a)
Similarly, using (2b), we see that supplier R can induce a profitable deviation away
from the order (α, γ) if there exists an allocation (α, bγ) such that
CR(γ)+βK
³
{1− (α+ γ)}+
´
+(1−β)K(1−γ) > CR(bγ)+βK ³{1− (α+ bγ)}+´+(1−β)K(1−bγ).
(3b)
Now let us define two correspondences, BRU(γ) for supplier U andBRR(α) for supplier
R, where BRi : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], i = U, R, as follows:
BRU(γ) = argmin
0≤α≤1
CU(α) + βK
³
{1− (α+ γ)}+
´
, (4a)
BRR(α) = argmin
0≤γ≤1
CR(γ) + βK
³
{1− (α+ γ)}+
´
+ (1− β)K(1− γ). (4b)
11
Using conditions (4a) and (4b) we can interpret these two correspondences as follows.
It follows from (4a) that if the buyer places an order (α, γ) where α /∈ BRU(γ), then
supplier U can profitably induce the buyer to switch away from (α, γ) by changing his
bid at some α0 ∈ BRU(γ). Similarly, it follows from (4b) that if the buyer places an order
(α, γ) where γ /∈ BRR(α), then supplier R can profitably induce the buyer to switch away
from (α, γ) by changing his bid at some γ0 ∈ BRR(α). Note that as long as CU(·), CR(·)
and K(·) are continuous, BRU(γ) and BRR(α) are non-empty.
Now let us define the set, N = {(α, γ) : α ∈ BRU(γ) and γ ∈ BRR(α)} . The following
lemma tells that any allocation that does not belong to this set, N , cannot be a Nash
equilibrium outcome.
Lemma 3. Suppose (α, γ) /∈ N , then (α, γ) is not an Nash equilibrium outcome.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from the interpretations of the correspondences
BRU(γ) and BRR(α) given above. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3 shows that a necessary condition for (α, γ) to be an equilibrium outcome is
that (α, γ) belongs to the set N. Proposition 1 says that this condition is also suﬃcient.
Proposition 1. (a) Consider the set N = {(α, γ) : α ∈ BRU(γ) and γ ∈ BRR(α)} . N
is the set of equilibrium outcomes of the auction game under consideration.
(b) Let (α∗, γ∗) ∈ N. If (P ∗U(α), P ∗R(γ)) is a pair of Nash equilibrium bids with (α∗, γ∗) as
an equilibrium outcome, then the equilibrium procurement price (g∗) and supplier profits
(π∗U and π
∗
R) satisfy the following conditions:
g∗ ∈ [max {TSC(α, 0), TSC(0, γ)} , TSC(α, 0) + TSC(0, γ)− TSC(α∗, γ∗)], 14 (5)
π∗U ∈ [g∗ − TSC(α, 0), TSC(0, γ)− TSC(α∗, γ∗)], (6)
π∗R ∈ [g∗ − TSC(0, γ), TSC(α, 0)− TSC(α∗, γ∗)]. (7)
14Note that α and γ are as defined in Lemma 1.
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The suﬃciency part in the proof of Proposition 1 involves constructing bid functions for
the two suppliers (P ∗U(·), P ∗R(·)) so that any (α, γ) ∈ N can be supported as an equilibrium
outcome, that is, the bids satisfy the condition of Lemma 1 and the deviation conditions
(2a) and (2b). The conditions (5), (6) and (7) are used to construct bid prices at the
awards (α∗, γ∗), (α, 0) and (0, γ). We discuss the outline of the proof; the details are
omitted and are available from the authors.15
To summarize the results of this section, for any (α, γ) ∈ N, the suppliers can structure
their bids so as to support it as an equilibrium outcome. Further, in equilibrium, there
exists a range of profits for the suppliers as well as a range of procurement price for the
buyer. Of course, the buyer would like to pay the lowest procurement price whereas the
suppliers would want to earn the maximum individual profits. This issue of conflicting
objectives of the buyer and the suppliers is discussed in the next subsection.
3.4. Eﬃciency of Nash Equilibrium Outcomes and Strengthened Implicit Price
Collusion
While one of the major justifications for multi-sourcing in procurement auctions is to
promote competition, Anton and Yao (1989) establish that split-award auctions eﬀectively
present the suppliers with an invitation for implicit price collusion where the buyer ends
up in paying the highest possible equilibrium procurement price. But, note that, in Anton-
Yao model the buyer is restricted to split-awards only, that is, α + γ = 1. In our model,
we allow the buyer with the flexibility of over-procurement (to hedge against the failure
of the unreliable supplier from not delivering) and under-procurement (that is, to move
15In order to get the lower bound on g∗ and the suppliers’ profits, note from Lemma 1 that the
equilibrium price corresponds to the bids at the sole-sourcing outcomes (α, 0) and (0, γ). Therefore, since
supplier profits are non-negative, the equilibrium price must exceed the sole-sourcing production costs
of both the suppliers. The upper bounds for the suppliers’ profits in (6) and (7) are determined from
the deviation conditions (2a) and (2b) which ensure that (α∗, γ∗) is the equilibrium outcome and can
withstand the sole-sourcing bids at (α, 0) and (0, γ) for suppliers U and R respectively. Finally, the upper
bound on g∗ is determined by using the definition of π∗U and π
∗
R, and using the upper bounds derived for
them.
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part of the production in-house). As a result of this added flexibility in order allocation,
one would expect, a priori, that the buyer would be better of. But, to the contrary, it
turns out that this added flexibility strengthens the implicit price collusion possibility
between the suppliers. As an important step in establishing this, we first show that any
Nash equilibrium outcome is also an eﬃcient outcome and vice-versa.
Recall that given any order (α, γ), the total system cost is defined as TSC(α, γ) =
CU(α)+CR(γ)+βK
³
{1− (α+ γ)}+
´
+(1−β)K(1− γ). An outcome (αE, γE) is called
eﬃcient if it minimizes the total system cost, that is,
(αE, γE) ∈ argmin
(α,γ)∈[0,1]×[0,1]
{TSC(α, γ)} . (8)
Proposition 2. Suppose the cost functions CU(·), CR(·) and K(·) are convex. Let
E =
(
(α, γ) : (α, γ) ∈ argmin
(α0,γ0)∈[0,1]×[0,1]
{TSC(α0, γ0)}
)
be the set of eﬃcient outcomes. Then
E = N, that is, the set of eﬃcient outcomes coincides with the set of Nash equilibrium
outcomes.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 1. If the cost functions CU(·), CR(·) and K(·) are strictly convex, then the
Nash equilibrium outcome (which is also the eﬃcient outcome) is unique.
Proof. When the cost functions are strictly convex, TSC(α, γ) is also strictly convex so
that the eﬃcient outcome is unique. Then it follows from Proposition 2 that the Nash
equilibrium outcome is unique as well. Q.E.D.
Now let us turn to the issue of implicit price collusion. Recall that the equilibrium
procurement price, g∗, is defined by g∗ = βP ∗U(α
∗)+P ∗R(γ
∗)+βK
³
{1− (α∗ + γ∗)}+
´
+(1−
β)K(1− γ∗). On rearranging terms above, it follows that, in equilibrium, the joint profit
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for the suppliers is given by π∗U + π
∗
R = g
∗ − TSC(α∗, γ∗). Proposition 1 defines a range
of equilibrium profits for the two suppliers and hence a range for the joint profit. The
suppliers can collude implicitly by structuring their bids so as to achieve the maximum
possible joint profit. But since (α∗, γ∗) also minimizes TSC(α, γ) (from Proposition 2), it
follows from the expression for π∗U+π
∗
R that coordinating the bids to attain the maximum
joint profit is equivalent to forcing the buyer to pay the highest possible procurement price,
g∗ = TSC(α, 0)+ TSC(0, γ)− TSC(α∗, γ∗) (which is the upper bound of g∗ in condition
(5)).
Let g∗c, π∗cU and π
∗c
R denote the procurement price and the suppliers’ profits under
implicit price collusion. Then, g∗c = TSC(α, 0) + TSC(0, γ) − TSC(α∗, γ∗). To be sus-
tainable, the colluding bids have to be incentive compatible, that is, each supplier earns
a profit under collusion that is as much as the profit from a sole-source deviation. Con-
sider supplier U. It follows from Lemma 1 (and the definition of πU(α)) that the sole-
source threat point for supplier U is g∗c−TSC(α, 0). The incentive compatibility implies
π∗cU ≥ g∗c − TSC(α, 0) = TSC(0, γ) − TSC(α∗, γ∗). But, condition (6) says that π∗cU ≤
TSC(0, γ) − TSC(α∗, γ∗). Combining the two, we get π∗cU = TSC(0, γ) − TSC(α∗, γ∗),
the upper bound of π∗U in condition (6). Similarly, for supplier R we can show that
π∗cR = TSC(α, 0)− TSC(α∗, γ∗), the upper bound of π∗R in condition (7).
The above discussion can be summarized as follows. In the auction game under consid-
eration, although the buyer has a flexibility in order allocation, the suppliers can (implic-
itly) coordinate their bids such that the buyer ends up paying the maximum (worst-case)
procurement price and the bids generate the highest possible individual profit for each
supplier and the maximum joint profit.
In case of Anton-Yao model, the eﬃcient outcome is only one equilibrium outcome in
a potentially large set of equilibrium outcomes. For each equilibrium outcome, implicit
collusion leads to the highest procurement price for the buyer for that outcome. However,
the truly worst scenario for the buyer is realized when the Nash outcome is also eﬃcient.
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In our model, the set of Nash outcomes coincides with the set of eﬃcient outcomes and
is unique for the case of strictly convex costs. Then, the procurement price for the
buyer is the maximum possible, that is, implicit collusion always leads to the worst case
outcome for the buyer, and hence, implicit price collusive behavior between the suppliers
is strengthened.
4. An Example with Quadratic Cost Functions
In order to get closed-form solutions, in this section we assume that the cost functions take
the quadratic form: CU(α) = Uα2, CR(γ) = Rγ2, and K(δ) = Kδ2, where U < R < K.
The cost functions being strictly convex, the Nash equilibrium outcome is unique and so
we can do comparative statics analysis of the eﬀects of various costs and the reliability of
delivery. Further, using this example, we illustrate that the eﬃcient outcome is the only
robust equilibrium outcome in the continuum of equilibrium outcomes in Anton and Yao
(1989) model.
From Lemma 2 we know that over-ordering (α + γ > 1) cannot be an equilibrium
outcome. Then, we can derive the BRi functions, i = U, R, as follows:
BRU(γ) = argmin
0≤α≤1
CU(α) + βK (1− (α+ γ)) = (
βK
U + βK
)(1− γ),
BRR(α) = argmin
0≤γ≤1
CR(γ) + βK (1− (α+ γ)) + (1− β)K(1− γ)
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
K
K +R
−
Ã
βK
K +R
!
α, for α ≤ R
R+ (1− β)K ;
(1− β)K
R+ (1− β)K, for α >
R
R+ (1− β)K.
[ Insert Figure 1 about here ]
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In Figure 1, the straight line AD represents BRU(γ) and the line segments GH and
HF represent BRR(α). The figure also illustrates the interpretation of the BRi functions
provided earlier. For instance, the order (α, γ) corresponding to point L, name it (αL,
γL), cannot be an equilibrium outcome because supplier U can profitably induce the buyer
to switch away from (αL, γL) by changing his bid at αM which is U ’s share at the order
corresponding to point M. Similarly, (αM , γM) cannot be an equilibrium outcome because
R can induce a profitable deviation away from (αM , γM) by changing his bid at γQ which
is R’s share at the order corresponding to point Q.
The BRi functions intersect at the point N resulting in the unique Nash equilibrium
outcome (α∗, γ∗) (which is also the unique eﬃcient outcome, as follows from Proposition
2). Using the BRi functions we can solve for α∗ and γ∗ as
α∗ =
βKR
(R+ (1− β)K)(U + βK) + βKU ,
γ∗ =
(1− β)K(U + βK) + βKU
(R+ (1− β)K)(U + βK) + βKU .
(9)
With quadratic cost functions, the auction game under consideration has a unique
Nash equilibrium outcome in which α∗x units are awarded to supplier U and γ∗x units
are awarded to supplier R, where α∗ + γ∗ < 1; the remainder, (1 − (α∗ + γ∗))x units,
is allocated to the in-house production facility. Interestingly, a split-award allocation
(α + γ = 1) is not an equilibrium in this example. The intuition for this is as follows.
Since K(·) is quadratic, the marginal cost of producing a very small amount in-house is
close to zero. But the marginal costs of the suppliers are strictly positive for any multi-
sourcing split-award allocation. Thus, in the margin, it pays the buyer to devote some
amount for in-house production rather than awarding the full tender to the suppliers.
17
4.1. Comparative Statics
We can make some interesting observations about the individual allocations to the sup-
pliers and their total allocation by conducting some simple comparative statics exercises.
From (9) we observe, as expected, that as the reliability of supplier U decreases (that
is, as β decreases), his allocation, α∗, decreases, whereas the allocation for the reliable
supplier, γ∗, increases. For the total allocation, (α∗ + γ∗), we observe that there exists a
critical value, eβ (where eβ = 1
2
+
R
2K
), such that for β > eβ, the total allocation, (α∗+γ∗),
increases as β decreases, whereas for β < eβ, the total allocation decreases as β decreases.
This can be explained as follows. Start from the situation when β = 1, that is, both the
suppliers are reliable. Now, if β is slightly less than 1, the total allocation increases (in
the form of higher allocation to the reliable supplier) to hedge against the failure of the
unreliable supplier from not delivering on time. However, as β decreases even further,
allocation for the unreliable supplier becomes riskier and the reduction in its allocation
may not be oﬀset by the increased allocation for the reliable supplier. The critical value,
eβ, determines the threshold at which the total allocation (α∗ + γ∗) is maximized.
Another interesting observation is the eﬀect of in-house production cost on supplier
allocations.16 As K increases, the total allocation to the suppliers, (α∗ + γ∗), and the
allocation to the reliable supplier, γ∗, increases, as expected. However, for the unreliable
supplier, the allocation further depends on its variability in supply, defined as β(1− β).
We observe that if β(1−β) < UR
K2
, the allocation α∗ increases in K. But if the variability
in supply exceeds this threshold, allocation for the unreliable supplier becomes riskier
and, therefore, α∗ decreases in K.
16The eﬀects of the supplier costs are as expected: as the cost of the unreliable supplier increases (that is,
as U increases), the allocation to the reliable supplier increases, whereas the allocation to the unreliable
supplier and the total allocation decreases; similarly, as R increases, the allocation to the unreliable
supplier increases, whereas the allocation to the reliable supplier and the total allocation decreases.
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4.2. Robustness of the Multiplicity of Split Award Equilibria in Anton and
Yao (1989) Model
Anton and Yao (1989) derive a continuum of Nash equilibrium outcomes of which only
one is eﬃcient as defined earlier. Whereas, in our analysis, the set of equilibrium outcomes
coincides with the set of eﬃcient outcomes. It would be interesting to understand the
connection between the two models.
There is no supplier unreliability in A-Y model, that is, β = 1, and the option of
in-house production does not exist. But the most important diﬀerence between the two
models is that there is no room for over- or under-procurement in A-Y model, the orders
are always split awards, that is, α+γ = 1. Since there is no scope for under-procurement,
the buyer does not need to pay the penalty or to take recourse to the outside option K(·)
as envisaged in our model. Thus, A-Y model can be thought of as a limiting case of our
model in the following sense — it is the limit to our model when the penalty or the in-house
production option is prohibitively high (that is, K →∞ in the quadratic cost example).
When β = 1 in our model, from (9), the equilibrium outcome becomes α∗ |β=1 =
RK
RU +RK +KU
, γ∗ |β=1 = KU
RU +RK +KU
. Taking limits as K → ∞ we get lim
K→∞
α∗ |β=1 = R
R+ U
, and lim
K→∞
γ∗ |β=1 = U
R+ U
. Note that lim
K→∞
α∗ |β=1 + lim
K→∞
γ∗ |β=1 = 1.
Thus, when the buyer’s penalty for nondelivery is prohibitively high, he refrains from
under-procurement and awards an exact split in line with the suppliers’ costs of production
— the low-cost supplier U receives a larger share (now he is perfectly reliable since β = 1),
and the high-cost supplier R gets a lower share.
Using our notation, the set of split-award equilibrium outcomes in A-Y model (Propo-
sition 2, pp. 544) can be described asN = {α : CU(α) + CR(1− α) < CU(1), 0 < α < 1} .
WhenCU(·) andCR(·) are quadratic, this set becomesN =
½
α :
1− α
1 + α
<
U
R
, 0 < α < 1
¾
.
Continuing with quadratic CU(·) and CR(·), the eﬃcient outcome in A-Y model, de-
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fined as, (αE |A−Y , γE |A−Y ) ∈ argmin
(α,γ)∈[0,1]×[0,1]
{CU(α) + CR(γ)} , is (αE |A−Y = R
R+ U
,
γE |A−Y = U
R+ U
). It is easy to check that the eﬃcient outcome belongs to N.
So, in the limit, when K is infinitely high, the equilibrium outcome in our model
converges to the eﬃcient outcome in A-Y model, and the eﬃcient outcome is also an
equilibrium outcome there. Since A-Y model can be interpreted as a limiting case of our
model when K is infinitely high, our analysis demonstrates that the eﬃcient outcome is
the only robust outcome in A-Y model.
5. Conclusions and Future Research
We now summarize the main contributions of the paper, discuss the limitations, and
suggest directions for future research.
The appeal of doing business on the web is clear. As more and more entrants join in
the B2B marketplace, electronic hubs — or e-hubs — have proliferated oﬀering expanded
choices to buyers and suppliers. In most Net marketplaces, price-driven auctions have
become the most popular matchmaking method. However, the presence of unreliable
suppliers oﬀering low-priced bids posses new challenges for buyers in creating a successful
e-business strategy. An important consideration for the buyer when making allocation
decisions across unreliable and reliable suppliers is the level of risk he would be willing to
take. We addressed this issue in our paper by considering the procurement problem for
a buyer facing bids from an unreliable but cheaper supplier and a reliable but expensive
supplier. The unique feature of our model was to allow the buyer to determine the size of
the total tender awarded as a function of the bids received from the suppliers. As a result
of this flexibility in order allocation, the ex-ante expectation was that the buyer would
benefit. However, for the case of convex production costs, the set of Nash equilibrium
outcomes coincides with the set of eﬃcient outcomes, and as a result, the possibility
of implicit supplier collusion is strengthened and the buyer incurs the highest possible
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procurement cost. Using the example of quadratic costs, we performed comparative statics
analysis and determined the critical threshold values of the probability and variability in
delivery, which influence not only the fractional tender awarded to the suppliers but also
the quantity reserved for in-house production.
The analysis in this paper assumes the case of perfect information, that is, the buyer
and the suppliers have full information about each other’s costs. In future research, we
plan to consider the more general case of imperfect information, and analyze the eﬀect
of private cost information on the equilibrium bids and the possibility of price collusion.
Second, in this paper, we focused on an “all or nothing” delivery model. In future research,
it is important to study the impact of diﬀerent supply models in which the unreliable
supplier delivers a random fraction of the order quantity. Order allocation/diversification
problems with random deliveries have been addressed in the literature (see Yano and
Lee (1995) for a comprehensive review) but have assumed exogenous supplier prices in
the models. Third, in many e-commerce settings — especially for the case of first-time
interactions — the buyer and the unreliable supplier may have diﬀerent beliefs on the
nature of supply unreliability in the supply chain. How would the beliefs on supply
reliability aﬀect the buyer’s relationship with its reliable suppliers? In future research, we
plan to analyze this issue which would also influence the in-house production decision of
the buyer.
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6. Appendix
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1.
It follows from the definition of g∗ that g∗ ≤ βP ∗U(α) + βK(1− α) + (1− β)K(1), for all
α ∈ (0, 1], and g∗ ≤ P ∗R(γ) + K(1 − γ), for all γ ∈ (0, 1]. We will just prove that there
exists γ ∈ (0, 1] such that g∗ = P ∗R(γ) +K(1− γ). The proof is similar for α ∈ (0, 1].
Suppose not. Then P ∗R(γ) +K(1− γ) > g∗, for all γ ∈ (0, 1]. Let ε = minγ∈(0,1] P
∗
R(γ) +
K(1− γ)− g∗.17 Now consider supplier U ’s bid, defined by
PU(α) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
P ∗U(α) +
ε
2
, for α 6= α∗, α 6= 0
P ∗U(α) +
ε
3
, for α = α∗
0, for α = 0,
where (α∗, γ∗) is the procurement cost minimizing order placed by the buyer in the equi-
librium under consideration. But supplier U ’s bid is constructed such that given supplier
R’s equilibrium bid, P ∗R(γ), (α
∗, γ∗) remains to be the procurement cost minimizing choice
for the buyer, and, at the same time, supplier U ’s profits are greater with PU(α) than
with P ∗U(α). This contradicts the fact that P
∗
U(α) is a best response. Q.E.D.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2.
We have demonstrated in Lemma 2 that an order (α, γ) such that 0 < α ≤ 1, 0 < γ ≤ 1,
and α+γ > 1 is not a Nash equilibrium outcome. As a first step in proving the equivalence
of the sets E and N we need to show that such an order is not an eﬃcient outcome either.
Compare (α, γ) such that 0 < α ≤ 1, 0 < γ ≤ 1, and α+γ > 1 with (α0, γ) such that 0 <
α0 ≤ 1, 0 < γ ≤ 1, and α0+γ = 1.We have TSC(α, γ) = CU(α)+CR(γ)+(1−β)K(1−γ)
and TSC(α0, γ) = CU(α0) + CR(γ) + (1− β)K(1− γ). Clearly, TSC(α, γ) > TSC(α0, γ)
17If a minimum does not exist, use the infimum.
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when CU(·) is strictly increasing. This proves that (α, γ) such that 0 < α ≤ 1, 0 < γ ≤ 1,
and α+ γ > 1 is not an eﬃcient outcome.
Now, since the possibility of over-ordering is ruled out as both Nash equilibrium and
eﬃcient outcomes, the sets E and N get reduced to the following:
E =
(
(α, γ) : (α, γ) ∈ argmin
(α0,γ0)∈[0,1]×[0,1]
CU(α0) + CR(γ0) + βK (1− (α0 + γ0)) + (1− β)K(1− γ0)
)
,
N =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(α, γ) :
α ∈ BRU(γ) = argmin
0≤α0≤1
CU(α0) + βK (1− (α0 + γ)) and
γ ∈ BRR(α) = argmin
0≤γ0≤1
CR(γ0) + βK (1− (α+ γ0)) + (1− β)K(1− γ0)
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
.
Since CU(·), CR(·) and K(·) are convex, the functions defined by: (1) CU(α)+CR(γ)+
βK (1− (α+ γ)) + (1 − β)K(1 − γ), (2) CU(α) + βK (1− (α+ γ)) , and (3) CR(γ) +
βK (1− (α+ γ)) + (1− β)K(1− γ), are also jointly convex in α and γ.
First, consider the problem: Minimize
(α,γ)∈[0,1]×[0,1]
CU(α) + CR(γ) + βK (1− (α+ γ)) + (1 −
β)K(1− γ). Since the constraint set is compact and the objective function is continuous,
solution(s) to this problem exists (exist). The solutions are then completely character-
ized by the following first-order conditions (with the associated complementary slackness
conditions)18:
C 0U(α)− βK 0 (1− (α+ γ)) + λ1 ≥ 0, (A.1)
C 0R(γ)− βK 0 (1− (α+ γ))− (1− β)K 0(1− γ) + λ2 ≥ 0, (A.2)
where λ1 and λ2 are the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the constraints α ≤ 1 and
γ ≤ 1, respectively.
Next, consider the problem: Minimize
0≤α≤1
CU(α) + βK (1− (α+ γ)) , when γ is given.
Once again, the constraint set being compact and the objective function being continuous,
18The convexity of the objective function guarantees that the solutions to the first-order conditions are
indeed minimizers, and not maximizers.
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solution(s) to this problem exists (exist), and are characterized by the following first-order
condition (with the associated complementary slackness conditions):
C 0U(α)− βK 0 (1− (α+ γ)) + λ3 ≥ 0, (A.3)
where λ3 is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the constraint α ≤ 1.
Finally, consider the problem: Minimize
0≤γ≤1
CR(γ)+βK (1− (α+ γ))+(1−β)K(1−γ),
when α is given. The solution(s) to this problem exists (exist), and are characterized by the
following first-order condition (with the associated complementary slackness conditions):
C 0R(γ)− βK 0 (1− (α+ γ))− (1− β)K 0(1− γ) + λ4 ≥ 0, (A.4)
where λ4 is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the constraint γ ≤ 1.
In view of the above discussion, we can redefine the sets E and N as
E = {(α, γ) : (α, γ) solves equations (A.1) and (A.2)} ,
N = {(α, γ) : (α, γ) solves equations (A.3) and (A.4)} .
Since the system of equations (A.1) and (A.2) is identical to the system of equations (A.3)
and (A.4), we conclude that E = N . Q.E.D.
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Figure 1: Nash Equilibrium Outcome with Quadratic Costs
 
